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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL PROCEDURE-LANDLORD 
AND TENANT-RENT ESCROW STATUTE REQUIRING PAY-
MENT INTO ESCROW OF ACCRUED RENTS PURSUANT TO 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL IN SUMMARY EVICTION PRO-
CEEDING IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT OF 
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. v. Columbia 
Park & Recreation Ass'n, 64 Md. App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985). 
A landlord filed summary eviction proceedings in the District Court 
of Maryland for Howard County for the tenant's failure to pay rent, 1 and 
the tenant demanded a jury triaP Upon removal of the case to the Cir-
cuit Court of Maryland for Howard County,3 the tenant challenged the 
constitutionality of the relevant rent escrow statute.4 The statute re-
quired that where either the landlord or the tenant demanded a jury trial, 
the tenant shall pay into escrow all accrued rents as well as all rents 
accruing during the pendency of the trial. 5 The circuit court upheld the 
1. Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n, 64 Md. App. 222, 
494 A.2d 947 (1985). Summary eviction proceedings are set forth in Mo. REAL 
PROP. ConE ANN. § 8-401 (1981 & Supp. 1985), which reads in part: 
a) Right to Repossession - Whenever the tenant under any lease of 
property express or implied, verbal or written, shall fail to pay the rent 
when due and payable, it shall be lawful for the landlord to have again and 
repossess the premises so rented. 
2. 64 Md. App. at 226, 494 A.2d at 949. Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. is a subtenant of 
Columbia Park and Recreation Association which was a tenant of Howard Re-
search and Development. Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. operates the bar and restaurant 
at the site of what was previously the Allview Golf Course in Howard County, 
Maryland. /d. 
3. /d. at 227, 494 A.2d at 949. The case was removed to the circuit court pursuant to 
the tenant's demand for a jury trial. See Mo. CTS. & Jun. PROC. ConE ANN. § 4-
402(3)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1985) (transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the 
circuit court is required where there is a demand for trial by jury). The circuit court 
heard the tenant's motion to strike the escrow order and the landlord's motion for 
judgment simultaneously. 64 Md. App. at 227, 494 A.2d at 949. 
4. 64 Md. App. at 227, 494 A.2d at 949-50. 
5. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-118 (Supp. 1985) provides: 
a) Tenant to Pay Rents into Account- In an action under § 8-401, 
§ 8-402, or § 8-402.1 of this article in which a party prays a jury trial, the 
District Court shall enter an order directing the tenant or anyone holding 
under the tenant to pay all accrued and unpaid rents, and all rents due and 
as they come due during the pendency of the action, as prescribed in sub-
section (b) of this section. 
b) Escrow Accounts into Which Rents To Be Paid - The District 
Court shall order that the rents be paid into the registry of an escrow 
account of: 
(1) The clerk of the circuit court; or 
(2) If directed by the District Court, an administrative agency of the 
county which is empowered by local law to hold rents in escrow pending 
investigation and disposition of complaints by tenants. 
c) Failure to Pay Rent- In an action under§ 8-401, § 8-402, or§ 8-
402.1 of this article, if the tenant or anyone holding under the tenant fails 
to pay rent accrued or as it comes due pursuant to the terms of the order, 
the circuit court, on motion of the landlord and certification of the clerk or 
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constitutionality of the statute and entered judgment for the landlord. 6 
The tenant appealed on two grounds, contending that the statute in-
fringed upon the constitutional right to jury triaP and violated the ten-
ant's procedural due process rights by requiring payment of money and 
entry of judgment without a hearing. 8 The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland reversed the circuit court, holding that the statute was uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it required payment into escrow of accrued 
rents. The court held, however, that the provision requiring payment 
into escrow of accruing rents was constitutional. 9 The court also held 
that the statute satisfied procedural due process requirements by implic-
itly providing an opportunity for a hearing prior to requiring payment 
into escrow of accruing rents. 10 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that the jury trial is "the only anchor ever 
yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the princi-
ples of its constitution."11 The seventh amendment was ratified in 1791 
as part of the Bill of Rights to provide for the right to a jury trial in civil 
suits in the federal courts as the right existed in England. 12 The seventh 
amendment provides, "In suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved .... " 13 Courts consistently have interpreted the preservation 
language of the seventh amendment as requiring an "historical view" to 
the right to jury trial, 14 whereby the right must be preserved as it existed 
agency of the status of the account, shall give judgment in favor of the 
landlord and issue a warrant for possession. 
d) Distribution of Rent Escrow Account • Upon final disposition of 
the action, the circuit court shall order distribution of the rent escrow 
account in accordance with the judgment. If no judgment is entered, the 
circuit court shall order distribution to the party entitled to the rent es-
crow account after hearing. 
6. 64 Md. App. at 226-27, 494 A.2d at 949-50. The order included accrued rents 
totalling $6,710.66, as well as accruing rents of $2,500.00, for a total of $9,210.66. 
/d. 
7. In Maryland, the right to jury trial in civil proceedings is preserved by Mn. DECL. 
OF RIGHTS, art. 23, which provides in part, "The right of trial by Jury of all issues 
of fact in civil proceedings in the several courts of law in this State, where the 
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably 
preserved." See also MD. RULE 2-511(a) (1984) (hereinafter Md. Rule) ("The right 
of trial by jury as guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights or as provided by law shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."). 
8. 64 Md. App. at 227, 494 A.2d at 950. 
9. /d. at 240-41, 494 A.2d at 956-57. 
10. !d. at 239, 241, 494 A.2d at 955, 957. 
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (1789), quoted in Rooks, Sources of 
Trial by Jury in America, 19 TRIAL 46, 46 (1983). 
12. Rooks, Sources of Trial by Jury in America, 19 TRIAL 46, 49 (1983). 
13. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966). 
14. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 
639, 640 (1973). Wolfram suggests the historical approach first appeared in Justice 
Story's opinion in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) 
168 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 15 Thus, courts have held 
that the right to jury trial applies only in actions at law, not in equity; 16 
and only to factual issues, not legal issues.l' On the other hand, courts 
have held that the seventh amendment was intended to preserve the es-
sentials of the right without prescribing precisely when and how the right 
should be exercised. 18 Thus, even though the historical view generally 
preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at common law, the seventh 
amendment has been interpreted as elastic, enabling it to attach to new 
causes of action not in existence at common law in 1791.19 
Although the seventh amendment has been held to apply only to 
actions in federal courts,20 it has been cited frequently as persuasive au-
thority by state courts.21 Moreover, a vast majority of the state jurisdic-
tions have enacted similar constitutional provisions preserving the 
essentials of the right to jury trial. 22 In accord with the seventh amend-
(No. 16,750), and has been adopted without challenge by federal judges ever since. 
Id. at 640-41. 
15. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 171 (1979); Note, Civil Money Penalties, 33 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 724 (1976); Wolfram, supra note 14, at 640. 
16. The seventh amendment refers to "suits at common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (holding an 
order by the National Labor Relations Board to pay wages without a jury trial did 
not violate the seventh amendment because the order was a statutory proceeding 
and was incident to equitable relief). 
17. The fact finding function of the civil jury trial is preserved by the seventh amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which provides in part, "[N]o fact tried by 
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States than accord-
ing to the rules of common law." U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. See Baltimore and 
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (holding in a personal 
injury suit that "issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to 
be determined by the jury"). 
18. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155 (1973) ("[T]he Framers of the Seventh 
Amendment were concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in civil cases 
where it existed at common law, rather than the various incidents of trial by jury."). 
19. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978);see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 
195 (1974) (The right attaches to new causes of action when the action is: (1) an 
ordinary civil action; (2) in district court; (3) where no functional justification for 
denying the right exists.). 
20. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974); Colgrave v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 
169 n.4 (1973); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 
(1916). Contra Dice v. Akron, Canton and Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 
363 (1952) (indicating that, where strong federal interests are present (Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act), the seventh amendment may control, even though the case is 
brought in state court). 
21. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 291-92, 385 A.2d 57, 67, appeal 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 66, 257 A.2d 
187, 196 (1969). See also Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. 
L. REV. 427, 457 n.185 (1980). 
22. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16 ("Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be 
secured to all .... "); DEL CONST. art. 1, § 4 ("Trial by jury shall be as heretofore 
.... "); N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS art. 1, § 2 ("Trial by jury in all cases in which it has 
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate for-
ever .... "); PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1, § 6 ("Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, 
and the right thereof remain inviolate .... "); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("That in 
controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is 
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ment, these state constitutional provisions generally protect the right to 
jury trial as it existed at common law. 
Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland's coun-
terpart to the seventh amendment, preserves the common law right to a 
civil jury trial. 23 Article 23 states, "the right of trial by jury of all issues 
of fact in civil proceedings in the Courts of Law of this State, where the 
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be 
inviolably preserved."24 A further indication that the Maryland legisla-
ture intended to adopt the English common law right is the fact that 
article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights sets July 4, 1776 as the 
historical marker for the adoption of the common law from England. 25 
Thus, in accord with the seventh amendment, the right to a jury trial in 
civil actions tried in Maryland courts attaches to factual issues26 in ac-
tions at law, not equity.27 In compliance with the federal judiciary's in-
terpretation of the seventh amendment, Maryland courts have construed 
article 23 as preserving the right to jury trial without circumscribing the 
incidentals. As stated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Knee v. 
Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company,28 "[courts have] always 
preserv[ed] unimpaired the ultimate historical right as it existed at the 
time of our separation from the mother country, while sustaining all rea-
sonable regulations of the exercise of that right made in the interest of 
preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred .... "); W. VA. CoNST. art. 3, 
§ 13 ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dol-
lars exclusive of interest and cost, the right of trial by jury, if required by either 
party, shall be preserved .... "). The only states which appear not to have adopted 
state constitutional provisions similar to the seventh amendment are Louisiana and 
Colorado. 
23. Brown, supra note 21, at 456. 
24. Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23. The present article 23 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights was incorporated in 1978 from article XV, section 5 of the Maryland 
Constitution of 1867. Prior to that, the right to jury trial in civil cases had been 
subjected to a $5.00 amount in controversy in article XII, section 4 of the Maryland 
Constitution of 1864 and the Maryland Constitution of 1851. The right to jury trial 
in Maryland initially appeared in article III of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Maryland Constitution of 1776. For the history of Maryland civil jury trial provi-
sions, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 173 n.3, 423 A.2d 558, 561 n.3 (1980). 
25. The Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 provides in part, "That the Inhabitants of Mary-
land are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according 
to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as 
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy six .... " 
See also Brown, supra note 21, at 456 (stating that article 5 does not enlarge upon 
the right to jury trial formerly included in article XV, section 6 of the Mo. CoNST. 
of 1867, and now in article 23 of the MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS). 
26. Mo. DEcL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 provides for "trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil 
proceedings." See also Mo. RULE 2-325 (1985) (which provides in part, (a) De-
mand- Any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury ... ). 
27. Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 provides for jury trial in the "several Courts of Law." 
For a general discussion of the right to jury trial not applying to actions in equity, 
see Bourne & Lynch, Merger of Law and Equity Under the Revised Maryland Rules: 
Does it Threaten Trial by Jury?, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 35-37 (1984). 
28. 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898). 
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the general public."29 Despite the apparent similarities between the sev-
enth amendment and article 23, the right to jury trial in Maryland is 
potentially more flexible. The Maryland legislature possesses more dis-
cretion to alter the spheres of law and equity than Congress and the fed-
eral judiciary. 30 This increased legislative power is one difference 
between the right to jury trial in a Maryland court as opposed to the 
right to jury trial in a federal court. 3t 
Summary eviction proceedings exist in some form in every jurisdic-
tion to provide for a speedy judicial remedy in cases where it is alleged 
that a tenant is holding over wrongfully after termination of the lease. 32 
Both federal and Maryland courts have adopted the historical approach 
in determining whether the right to jury trial should attach to summary 
eviction proceedings. 33 The United States Supreme Court, in Pernell v. 
Southall Realty,34 held that any party to a summary eviction proceeding 
is entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment35 because the 
right to jury trial attached to the recovery of real property at common 
law.36 The Pernell Court observed that the twelfth century actions of 
assize of novel disseisin37 and writ of entry38 were actions which pro-
vided for jury trial and likened them to the summary eviction statute 
before the Court. 39 When the United States Constitution was adopted, 
both assize and writs of entry had fallen into disuse and were replaced by 
29. Id. at 627, 40 A. at 892. 
30. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 27, at 29-34. The legislative power to enlarge equity 
jurisdiction in Maryland was suggested in Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220, 224, 34 
A. 251, 252 (1896). Contra McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 493, 17 A. 387, 387 
(1889). 
31. Two other differences are: 1) $500.00 amount in controversy under MD. DECL. OF 
RIGHTS art. 23 and $20.00 under U.S. CONST. amend. VII; and (2) 1776 for the 
adoption of the common law from England under MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 and 
1791 for the year of adoption under U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. 
32. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CoDE§§ 1159-1179a. (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) (sum-
mary proceedings for obtaining possession of real property in certain cases); DEL 
CoDE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5701-5715 (1974 & Supp. 1984) (summary proceeding for 
possession); D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 16-1501 to 16-1505 (1981 & Supp. 1986) (forcible 
entry and detainer); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAWS§§ 701-767 (McKinney 1979 & 
Supp. 1986) (summary proceeding to recover possession of real property); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.501-250.511 (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985) (recovery of 
possession); VA. CODE§§ 8.01-124 to 8.01-130 (1984 & Supp. 1986) (unlawful entry 
and detainer); W.VA. CODE§§ 55-3-1 to 55-3-6 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (unlawful 
entry or detainer). 
33. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 
335 A.2d 670, application for stay denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). 
34. 416 U.S. 363 (1974). 
35. The seventh amendment had application because the landlord-tenant dispute oc-
curred in Washington, D.C., a federal jurisdiction. Id. at 370. 
36. Id. at 376. 
37. "A writ of assize which lay for the recovery of lands or tenements, where the claim-
ant had been lately disseised." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (5th ed. 1979). 
38. "A real action to recover the possession of land where the tenant has been disseised 
or otherwise wrongfully dispossessed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (5th ed. 
1979). . 
39. 416 U.S. at 371-72. 
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the action of ejectment,40 which also permitted jury resolution of factual 
issues.41 The Court ruled that the summary eviction proceeding served 
the same essential function as common law ejectment, and accordingly 
either party was entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment.42 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bringe v. Collins,43 noted 
that any party to a summary eviction proceeding is entitled to a jury trial 
under article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the right 
to recover real property was a right protected at common law.44 
Under the historical approach, the right to jury trial does not attach 
per se to every type of civil suit.45 Nor under the flexible construction of 
the seventh amendment is the right to jury trial immune from reasonable 
procedural regulation.46 Justice Brandeis commented on the right to 
jury trial under the seventh amendment: "New devices may be used to 
adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an effi-
cient instrument in the administration of justice."47 Several provisions 
regulating the right to jury trial have been upheld as constitutional. The 
requirements that a demand for a jury trial be made48 in writing, 49 and 
filed within ten days after commencement of the action50 are reasonable 
procedural regulations of the right to jury trial. Similarly, certain proce-
40. /d. at 372. 
41. /d. at 374 n.17. 
42. /d. at 374. The Pernell Court relied upon Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) in 
stating the seventh amendment right extends beyond exa«t forms of common law 
actions. /d. 
43. 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670, application for stay denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). 
44. /d. at 346-47, 335 A.2d at 676. See id. at 347 n.3, 335 A.2d at 676 n.3 (Ch. 43 of the 
Acts of 1793, the ancestor of MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-402(b) (1981), pro-
vided expressly for a jury trial). 
45. The right does not attach to actions in equity because the seventh amendment refers 
to "suits at common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937). MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 refers to 
"civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law." See also Capron v. Devries, 83 
Md. 220, 224, 34 A. 251, 252 (1896) ("It must be evident that there is no reference 
to a trial of an issue of fact in another jurisdiction: - a Court of Equity for in-
stance."). Neither does the right attach to administrative proceedings. See Atlas 
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 445 
(1977); NLRB, 301 U.S. at 48-49. Nor does it attach to bankruptcy proceedings. 
See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966). 
46. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1920); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. 
United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902); Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp, 237 Iowa 279, 
281-83, 21 N.W.2d 457, 458 (1946); Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 132-33, 48 
N.E.2d 508, 510-11 (1943). 
47. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920) (holding that a court order ap-
pointing an auditor and providing for use of the audit as prima facie evidence at trial 
was not an unconstitutional infringement on the right to jury trial). Justice Bran-
deis continued: "Indeed, such changes are essential to the preservation of the right. 
The limitation imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of 
trial by jury be not obstructed, and the ultimate determination of issues of fact by 
the jury be not interfered with." /d. at 310. 
48. Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp, 237 Iowa 279, 281-83, 21 N.W.2d 457, 458 (1946). 
49. Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 132-33, 48 N.E.2d 508, 510-11 (1943). 
50. State Tax Comm'n v. Stanley, 234 Ala. 66, 69, 173 So. 609, 611 (1937). 
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dures allowing the trial judge greater control over the jury, such as sum-
mary judgment,51 declaratory judgment,52 and an auditor's hearing,53 
also are reasonable procedural regulations of the right. In addition, con-
ditioning the right to jury trial upon the payment of court costs54 is a 
reasonable procedural regulation. 
The right to jury trial in Maryland is also subject to reasonable pro-
cedural regulation. 55 The Maryland rules of civil procedure require that 
the demand for a jury trial of any issue of fact be in writing, 56 and filed 
within fifteen days after service of the last pleading on an issue, 57 and also 
allow for a motion for summary judgment. 58 Case law has held these 
rules to be reasonable procedural regulations of the right to jury trial. 59 
Two decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarify the anal-
ysis used in determining the reasonableness of a regulation of the right to 
51. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902). 
52. New York Life Ins. Co. v. London, 15 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D. Mass. 1936). 
53. Fratantonio v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 297 Mass. 21,23-24, 8 N.E.2d 168, 169-70 (1937). 
54. State v. Griffin, 66 N.H. 326, 327-28, 29 A. 414, 415 (1890). Contra LaBowe v. 
Balthazor, 180 Wis. 419, 420-23, 193 N.W. 244, 245-46 (1923) (holding the require-
ment of prepaying $2.00 per juror to obtain a jury trial in a municipal court violated 
the constitutional right to trial by jury). 
55. Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 347, 335 A.2d 670, 676 (1975) (when a party fails to 
elect a jury trial in accordance with statutory provisions and procedural rules he 
waives right to trial by jury). See also Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 
291-92, 385 A.2d 57, 67 (suggesting that Justice Brandeis' views of procedural limi-
tations on the seventh amendment apply with equal force to Maryland's right to 
jury trial), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). See supra notes 46-47 and accom-
panying text. 
56. The demand provision is included in Mo. RULE 2-325 (1985) and provides: 
(a) Demand- Any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by filing a demand therefor in writing either as a separate 
paper or separately titled at the conclusion of a pleading and immediately 
preceding any required certificate of service. 
57. The waiver provision is included in Mo. RULE 2-325(b) (1985) and provides, "The 
failure of a party to file the demand within 15 days after service of the last pleading 
filed by any party directed to the issue constitutes a waiver of trial by jury." 
58. The motion for summary judgment is now provided for in Mo. RULE 2-501(c) 
(1985) and provides in part, "The court shall enter judgment in favor or against the 
moving party if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that 
the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
Jaw." 
59. The Maryland courts have not ruled on the constitutionality (Jf the current written 
demand provision, but have upheld the predecessors to that provision in Thompson 
v. Giordano, 16 Md. App. 264, 271, 295 A.2d 881, 885 (1972); Md. Community 
Developers, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 261 Md. 205, 213-14, 274 A.2d 641, 646, 
appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971); and Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Accept-
ance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 14-24, 215 A.2d 192, 194-200 (1965). The Maryland courts 
have upheld the waiver provision in Fallon v. Agency Rent-A-Car System, 268 Md. 
585, 588-89, 303 A.2d 387, 389 (1973); and Bettum v. Montgomery Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 262 Md. 360, 366,277 A.2d 600,603 (1971). The summary judgment 
motion provision was upheld in Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 323-24, 104 A.2d 
624, 627-28 (1954). 
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jury trial. In Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, 60 after 
the trial court denied a new trial, appellate proceedings were stayed 
under a statute requiring the payment of appeal and former trial costs by 
the appellant.61 The court of appeals held that the statute was a reason-
able regulation of the right to jury trial. 62 Relying heavily on decisions in 
other jurisdictions, the court of appeals emphasized that the Maryland 
Constitution does not provide for the exact mode of the right to a jury 
trial. 63 Rather, the Declaration of Rights secures the right to a jury trial 
in its general common law form. 64 The court of appeals reasoned further 
that the particular regulation was constitutional because it could operate 
against either plaintiff or defendant, depending upon who was adjudged 
costs. 65 On this point, the court stated, "the constitution does not guar-
antee to the citizen the right to litigate without expense, but simply pro-
tects him from the imposition of such terms as unreasonably or 
injuriously interfere with his right to a remedy in the law."66 
In Bringe v. Collins, 67 a summary eviction proceeding, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in dicta upheld as constitutional the procedural 
rule waiving the right to jury trial unless timely made. 68 Under the facts 
in that case, the court found that no constitutional right to jury trial even 
existed because neither party sought money damages or claimed any 
monetary value on the right to possession69 and, as a result, the constitu-
tional $500.00 amount in controversy had not been met. 70 The court 
went on to state, however, that the provision waiving the right to jury 
trial was constitutional in cases where the right to jury trial does exist. 
The Bringe court concluded, "[the right to jury trial] can, for all practical 
purposes, become meaningless to the individual and burdensome to the 
state unless the exercise of it is regulated to some extent."71 
In Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. v. Columbia Park & R,ecreation Ass'n, 72 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ruled upon the constitutional-
ity of section 8-118 of the Maryland Real Property Code.73 In determin-
60. 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898). 
61. Id. at 633, 40 A. at 894. 
62. ld. 
63. Id. at 626-31, 40 A. at 892-93. 
64. ld. 
65. Id. at 627-28, 40 A. at 892. 
66. ld. at 630, 40 A. at 893 (quoting Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456 (1862)). 
67. 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670, application for stay denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). 
68. Id. at 347-51, 335 A.2d at 676-78. 
69. ld. at 339, 335 A.2d at 672. 
70. Id. at 345-47, 335 A.2d at 675-76. 
71. Id. at 350, 335 A.2d at 677-78 (quoting Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance 
Corp., 241 Md. 10, 14, 215 A.2d 192, 194 (1965)). 
72. 64 Md. App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985). 
73. The statute requires the tenant in landlord-tenant disputes, to pay accrued and ac-
cruing rents into escrow pursuant to a demand for a jury trial. Mo. REAL PROP. 
CODE ANN. § 8-118 (Supp. 1985). For the provisions of§ 8-118, see supra note 5. 
Section 8-118 was enacted in 1982 to apply to the following summary eviction pro-
ceedings: Failure to pay rent,§ 8-401; Holding Over,§ 8-402; and Breach of lease, 
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ing whether section 8-118(a) was an unreasonable regulation of the right 
to a jury trial, the court utilized a two tiered approach. First, the court 
addressed the provision of the statute requiring the payment of accrued 
rents into escrow as a condition precedent to obtaining a jury trial. 74 
According to the court, requiring the tenant to pay into escrow "all ac-
crued and unpaid rents and all rents due" presupposes a factual finding 
that money was in fact owed. 75 The court found that such presupposition 
encroached upon the jury's fact finding function. 76 The court also fo-
cused upon the practical effect of the prepayment. 77 The court reasoned 
that prepayment places a burdensome premium on the exercise of the 
right to a jury trial.78 The court noted that in the instant case the price 
to be paid by the tenant rendered the right practically unavailable. 79 
Thus, the court ruled that the portion of the statute requiring prepay-
ment of the accrued rent was an unreasonable regulation and therefore 
§ 8-402.1. The apparent intent behind the enactment of § 8-118 was to allow for a 
speedy resolution of landlord-tenant disputes, to allow for a ready fund for disburse-
ment if the landlord prevailed at trial, and to prevent the tena~t from wasting funds 
during the pendency of the trial. Brief for Appellee at 11-12, Lucky Ned Pepper's 
Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n, 64 Md. App. 22, 494 A.2d 947 (1985). 
Section 8-118 appears to be unique in tying the right to jury trial directly to 
rent escrow provisions in the same statute. Other types of rent escrow and bond 
statutes, however, do exist in various other jurisdictions to help provide for a 
speedy resolution of landlord-tenant disputes. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 25, 
§ 5717 (1974 & Supp. 1984) (the tenant is required to pay a bond or other assurance 
to stay an appeal from a judgment rendered in a summary proceeding for posses-
sion); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW§ 745 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1986) (in New 
York City, upon the tenant's second request for an adjournment, the court shall 
either direct the tenant to deposit future rent as it comes due with the court clerk, or 
pay out to another person or entity); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 105.115, 105.135, 105.140 
(1983) (upheld in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) as constitutional in requir-
ing rent security for a continuance beyond six days after service of the complaint in 
a proceeding under the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute); PA. 
R. Crv. P. D. J. § 1008(B) (Supp. 1985) (the common pleas courts, by local rule, 
may allow a tenant to pay into an escrow account monthly rental payments which 
come due during the pendency of an eviction judgment appeal to obtain a stay of 
proceedings); VA. CODE § 55-232 ( 1981) (in a distress action, the tenant must post a 
bond which is double the amount in controversy to remove the case to circuit 
court). 
74. 64 Md. App. at 230, 494 A.2d at 951. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. /d. at 230-32, 494 A.2d at 951. 
78. /d. at 231-32, 494 A.2d at 951-52. See also Barnes v. Meleski, 211 Md. 182, 126 
A.2d 599 (1956) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of a monetary condition 
on the exercise of a constitutional right). 
79. 64 Md. App. at 233, 494 A.2d at 952. The circuit court order included allegedly 
owed accrued rents of $6,710.66. /d. at 227, 494 A.2d at 950. The Lucky Ned 
Pepper's court distinguished the reasonable regulation upheld as constitutional in 
Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670 (1975), and in Knee v. Baltimore City 
Passenger Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898), from the requirement in the 
instant case. The timely election in Bringe was a "mere procedural rule," and the 
payment of court costs as a condition precedent to jury trial in Knee was a "minor" 
cost relating to "court administration." The requirement in the instant case, how-
ever, amounted to "all monies allegedy owed." !d. at 232, 494 A.2d at 952-53. 
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unconstitutional. so 
The court then addressed the provision of section 8-118(a) requiring 
the payment of accruing rents into escrow pursuant to a demand for a 
jury trial.8 1 The court analogized such payment to the continued pay-
ment of rent to a landlord pursuant to a continuance in a summary evic-
tion proceeding, noting that the latter type of payment was held to be 
constitutional in Lindsey v. Normet. 82 In Lindsey, the tenant was re-
quired to continue paying rent for possession of the landlord's property 
while awaiting the conclusion of the jury trial. 83 The Lucky Ned Pepper's 
court determined that payment of accruing rents into escrow was similar 
to the rent payments during continuance because it denotes the price the 
tenant must pay in order to remain in possession of the landlord's prop-
erty during the course of the jury trial. 84 As a result, the court held this 
provision of the statute to be a constitutional regulation of the right to 
jury trial. 85 The accrued rent portion was striken as unconstitutional 
based upon the general rule that, where a statute contemplates two sepa-
rate orders, the unconstitutional portion may be severed from the re-
maining constitutional portions. 86 
The Lucky Ned Pepper's court also held that section 8-118 did not 
deprive the litigants of procedural due process even though a hearing 
upon the tenant's failure to comply with an accruing escrow order was 
not explicitly required. 87 The court limited its procedural due process 
discussion to the escrow order relating to accruing rents because the ac-
80. Id. at 233, 240-41, 494 A.2d 953, 956. 
81. Id. at 233, 494 A.2d 953, 956. 
82. 405 u.s. 56 (1972). 
83. Id. at 67. In Lindsey, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Oregon's summary eviction statutes and specifically upheld the provision 
whereby the tenant was required to pay accruing rents pursuant to the tenant's 
request for a continuance. /d. 
84. 64 Md. App. at 233-34, 494 A.2d at 953. On the purpose of summary eviction 
proceedings in landlord-tenant disputes, the Lucky Ned Pepper's court stated, 
"Speedy adjudication is desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to undeserved 
economic loss and the tenant to unmerited harrassment and dispossession when his 
lease or rental agreement gives him the right to peaceful and undisturbed possession 
of the property." ld. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972)). For 
statutes of other jurisdictions which aid in the speedy resolution of landlord-tenant 
disputes, and also serve to provide for a ready fund for disbursement, see supra note 
73. 
85. 64 Md. App. at 234, 494 A.2d at 953. 
86. /d. at 229-30, 494 A.2d at 951. 
87. ld. at 235-40, 494 A.2d at 953-56. The due process argument was appellant's pri-
mary argument. See Brief for Appellant at 21-27, Lucky Ned Pepper's v. Columbia 
Park & Recreation Ass'n, 64 Md. App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985). Maryland's due 
process provision, Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 reads, "That no man ought to be 
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, 
exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property but 
by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." The appellant also relied 
upon the federal due process provision in U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV § 1 which reads 
in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law." See Baltimore Belt R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 99, 23 A. 74, 
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crued rents provision already had been found unconstitutional. 88 
The court observed that in Department of Transportation, Motor Ve-
hicle Administration v. Armacost,89 Maryland had adopted the balancing 
test stated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 90 
for determining what procedural due process requirements are necessary 
prior to a deprivation of property. This test requires a balancing of: 
1) the private interests affected by the state action; 2) the risk of an erro-
neous deprivation, and the probable value of any procedural safeguards; 
and 3) the state interest in the taking.91 Relying on a series of United 
States Supreme Court cases regarding the procedural due process re-
quirements of prejudgment seizures,92 the Lucky Ned Pepper's court held 
that the tenant must have an opportunity for a hearing before he can be 
even temporarily deprived of a possessary interest in personalty.93 
Although section 8-118 does not provide for a hearing expressly, the 
court held that subsection (c) of the statute, when read in conjunction 
with the Maryland hearing provision, Rule 2-311(f), provides a tenant 
with an adequate opportunity for a hearing.94 Thus, section 8-118, to the 
extent that it provides for payment of accruing rent into escrow, com-
ports with due process requirements.95 
Finally, the Lucky Ned Pepper's court delineated the necessary pro-
cedure for the tenant to receive a hearing.96 The tenant must refuse to 
comply with the district court's escrow order.97 Upon the landlord's mo-
tion for judgment, the tenant must make his request for a hearing to 
74-75 (1891) (holding that Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is the 
equivalent of the due process clause of U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV § 1). 
88. 64 Md. App. at 235, 494 A.2d at 953. 
89. 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984). 
90. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
91. 299 Md. at 416-17, 474 A.2d at 203. The Lucky Ned Pepper's court also cited Barry 
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 22, 353 A.2d 222, 225 
(1976) where the court of appeals acknowledged that Maryland courts have looked 
to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance in the procedural due 
process area. Lucky Ned Pepper's at 235, 494 A.2d at 953. 
92. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The Mitchell statute was the only 
one held constitutional because in the other statutes: "There [was] no provision for 
an early hearing at which the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least 
probable cause for the [attachment]." North Georgia, 419 U.S. at 607. 
93. 64 Md. App. at 236-38, 494 A.2d at 954-55. 
94. /d. at 238-39, 494 A.2d at 955-56. Mo. RULE 2-31l(f) (1985) provides: 
A party desiring a hearing on a motion, other than a motion filed 
pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, shall so request in the motion or 
response under the heading "Request for Hearing." Except when a rule 
expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case 
whether a hearing will be held, but it may not render a decision that is 
dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as 
provided in this section. 
95. 64 Md. App. at 238-39, 241, 494 A.2d at 955-56. 
96. /d. at 239-40, 494 A.2d at 956. 
97. /d. at 239, 494 A.2d at 956. 
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dispute the district court's escrow order.98 At the hearing itself, the 
landlord bears the burden of showing that 1) the escrow order is valid; 
and 2) the tenant has not complied with the escrow order.99 Upon fail-
ure to meet this burden, the circuit court must deny the motion and set a 
trial by jury. 100 If, however, the landlord sustains both burdens, the 
court must consider the tenant's request for a jury trial waived and may 
proceed with a hearing on the merits of the landlord's claim or set the 
case for a non-jury trial. 101 According to the Lucky Ned Pepper's court, 
this procedure ensures that the tenant will not be divested of any prop-
erty interest until the landlord's motion for judgment is concluded. 102 
The decision of the Lucky Ned Pepper's court to strike the accrued 
rents portion of section 8-118 is consistent with a progression of United 
States Supreme Court and Maryland court decisions that have reflected 
the courts' disapproval of unreasonable regulations of the right to jury 
trial. 103 The Lucky Ned Pepper's court struck a compromise by uphold-
ing the portion of section 8-118 requiring a tenant to pay accruing rents 
into escrow in a summary eviction proceeding where a jury trial has been 
demanded. The court's compromise is tenable in one sense, because the 
purpose of a summary eviction proceeding is to provide a replacement 
for common law self-help remedies and to allow for a speedy judicial 
resolution of frequently arising landlord-tenant disputes. 104 Rent escrow 
provisions frequently are tied to summary eviction proceedings, as in the 
event the proceeding is continued, appealed, or stayed, the rent escrow 
provision deters the tenant from wasting funds during the pendency of 
the proceeding and provides a ready fund for disbursement if the land-
lord prevails at trial. 1os · 
Although seemingly meritorious, the court's holding in Lucky Ned 
Pepper's treads heavily on the constitutional right to jury trial. In up-
holding the accruing rents requirement, the court's reliance on Lindsey v. 
Normet is misplaced. 106 Lindsey deals merely with a statutory right to a 
continuance, 107 whereas Lucky Ned Pepper's involves the more critical 
98. Id. The appellant also claimed that no statute can provide for the district court's 
jurisdiction to order escrow payments because the district court is immediately 
divested of jurisdiction when the jury trial demand is filed. The court rejected ap-
pellant's argument on the basis that the legislature is permitted to extend district 
court jurisdiction, and the amendment in 1983 Md. Laws ch. 161 which inserted the 
phrase "the District Court shall enter an order directing" did in fact reflect a legisla-
tive intent to grant the district court jurisdiction over the entry of an escrow order 
pursuant to a jury demand. /d. at 240, 494 A.2d at 956. 
99. /d. at 239, 494 A.2d at 956. · 
100. /d. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. at 239-40, 494 A.2d at 956. 
103. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. 
104. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972); see supra note 84. 
105. For various state provisions, see supra note 73. 
106. 64 Md. App. at 233-34, 494 A.2d at 953, (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)). 
107. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72-73. 
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constitutionally guaranteed right to jury trial. 108 The accruing rents re-
quirement has the likely consequence of discouraging a tenant from exer-
cising the constitutional right to jury trial. Even where a tenant has a 
valid defense to an eviction proceeding, 109 the tenant may choose not to 
demand a jury trial because of the accruing rents requirement, and have 
his rent suspended under the doctrine of mutually dependent condi-
tions.110 Additionally, regardless of the existence of any potential de-
fenses, summary eviction proceedings are often very lengthy. The tenant 
who requests a jury trial ultimately may pay into escrow several months 
or more of accruing rents while awaiting a jury resolution. 111 Thus, 
whether the tenant has a valid defense or not, the tenant well may decide 
the jury trial is not worth the price. 
Because section 8-118 has the potential effect of discouraging a ten-
ant from exercising the right to jury trial, it is much more than a mere 
procedural regulation of a constitutional right. A comparison of the ac-
cruing rents requirement of section 8-118 with procedural regulations of 
the right to jury trial, 112 draws attention to the defect in the Lucky Ned 
Pepper's court's analysis. Requiring the payment of reasonable court 
costs or of demanding a jury trial within a certain number of days from 
commencement of a suit does not discourage a tenant from exercising the 
right to jury trial. Requiring payment into escrow of all rents accruing 
during the pendency of a trial, however, does discourage the tenant from 
excercising the right to jury trial. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
held that it is unconstitutional to impose a monetary condition on the 
exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right. 113 Even with the elimina-
108. 64 Md. App. at 229, 494 A.2d at 950. 
109. Such defenses might be retaliatory eviction or breach of implied warranty of habita-
bility. Indeed, the instant case provides an example of such a possible defense: 
landlord claimed rent on the basis of common area charges plus 7.5% of gross sales, 
whereas tenant claimed rent on the basis of 7.5% of gross sales only. Brief for 
Appellant at 10-12, Lucky Ned Peppers Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n, 
64 Md. App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985). 
110. The doctrine provides that certain obligations of the landlord are dependent on cer-
tain agreements of the tenant and vice versa. If one of the parties breaches the 
agreement, the other party's duty to perform its obligation is suspended until the 
breach is cured. It has been held that if the landlord breaches its implied warranty 
of habitability, the tenant's obligation to pay rent is thereby suspended. See, e.g., 
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of Cal., lOCal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 
1168, Ill Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 
A.2d 268 (1969). 
Ill. See G. LEFLOE, LAND FINANCIAL LAW, 75-76 (1969) (suggesting that typical un-
contested summary eviction proceedings can take several weeks and cost several 
hundred dollars). A more extreme illustration is provided in the instant case, be-
cause the jury trial in the circuit court did not take place until more than two years 
after the original trial date. 
112. Such regulations are court costs, demand provisions, and judge control over jury. 
See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. 
113. See Barnes v. Meleski, 211 Md. 182, 126 A.2d 599 (1956) (holding unconstitutional 
the requirement of payment of court costs as a precondition to the exercise of the 
former absolute right to removal in civil cases). 
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tion of the accrued rents portion of the statute, section 8-118 imposes an 
onerous monetary condition on the tenant which inevitably discourages 
him from exercising his constitutional right. Rent escrow provisions 
serve an important function in summary eviction proceedings, 114 but 
where the escrow provision is tied to the right to jury trial, the monetary 
condition attached to the constitutionally guaranteed right outweighs 
any socially desirable function served by the statute. 
Nevertheless, Lucky Ned Pepper's is an improvement on section 8-
118 as it existed prior to the court's ruling. A further legislative im-
provement on the statute, however, would be to eliminate the rent es-
crow provision entirely from the right to jury trial. The drafting of a new 
statute providing for rent escrow in the case of a continuance, stay, or 
appeal from a summary eviction proceeding would foster the purposes of 
a speedy judicial remedy while at the same time remove the existing con-
stitutional infirmities in section 8-118. A more novel resolution would be 
to draft a statute providing for an accelerated trial in summary eviction 
proceedings. 115 Maryland has several such provisions in other areas of 
the law where a speedy judicial remedy is essential. 116 Trials in summary 
eviction proceedings could be accelerated by a statute providing for the · 
prompt impanelment of a jury from the regular jury list or from jurors 
already in attendance at criminal court. 117 Such a provision in the land-
lord-tenant area could provide the desired speedy resolution of a sum-
mary eviction proceeding without the complexities and time 
consumption associated with rent escrow orders and hearings. More im-
portantly, this legislation would preserve the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to jury trial without requiring the citizens of Maryland to marshall 
sufficient funds to purchase it. 
David J. Weymer 
114. For an enumeration of such functions, see supra notes 73 & 84. 
115. See Backer, Collection of Rent and Recovery of Possession, 89 DICK. L. REv. 53, 88 
(1984) (suggesting the most functional way to improve the Pennsylvania rent escrow 
provisions would be to provide for an accelerated judicial remedy). 
116. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 209 (1980) (suit for collection of taxes to have prece-
dence over all other civil cases upon request of plaintiff); Mo. Crs. & Juo. PRoc. 
CoDE ANN. § 3-409(e) (1984) (court may order a speedy hearing of a declaratory 
judgment); Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 3-704(a) (1984) (judge shall im-
mediately inquire into legality and propriety of confinement upon return of writ of 
habeas corpus); Mo. STATE Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 10-623(c) (1984) (a proceeding 
regarding access to public records is to be expedited in every way); Mo. R.P. 2-
23l(b) (1985) (the court shall promptly schedule a hearing to determine the appro-
priate order of an interpleader); Mo. R.P. Ul4 (1985) (in eminent domain proceed-
ing, the court upon motion shall set the case for trial not less than 10 days or more 
than 30 days from the date of such motion). 
117. For a prompt impanelment of a jury in a proceeding for the appointment of a guard-
ian of an alleged disabled person, see Mo. R.P. R77(b) (1985) where said disabled 
person has neither consented to the appointment of the guardian nor has waived the 
right to jury trial. 
